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We provide a model with endogenous portfolios of secured and unsecured household debt. 
Secured debt is collateralized by owner-occupied housing whereas unsecured debt can be 
discharged according to bankruptcy regulations. We show that the calibrated model matches 
important quantitative characteristics of observed wealth and debt portfolios for prime-age 
consumers in the U.S. We then establish the quantitative result that home equity does not 
serve as informal collateral for unsecured debt since, as in the data, unsecured debtors hold 
small amounts of home equity in equilibrium. Thus, observed variations in homestead 
exemptions, which are an important part of U.S. bankruptcy regulation, have a small effect on 
the quantity and price of unsecured debt. 
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Household debt is sizeable and has increased substantially in the last decades in the U.S.,
the UK and most other European countries. The aggregate debt level hides substantial
di⁄erences between debt types and their composition on the balance sheets of individual
households. Most household debt is secured by housing collateral whereas some debt is un-
secured and can be written o⁄ in bankruptcy procedures in the U.S., the UK and some,
but not all, European countries.1 Interestingly, portfolios of these debt types di⁄er substan-
tially across households (see Section 2). In this paper we present a model which allows for
heterogeneity across households and generates such debt portfolios endogenously.
The key new feature in our model is housing which allows for a meaningful distinction
between secured and unsecured debt and thus permits us to analyze debt portfolios. We
obtain heterogeneity in debt portfolios by modeling consumer choices over the life cycle, as-
suming uncertain labor income and incomplete markets. Consumers then cannot fully insure
the labor-income risk and hold di⁄erent portfolios depending on their age and histories of
shocks. Micro-founded heterogeneous-agent models with these characteristics have been pio-
neered by Deaton (1991), Aiyagari (1994) and Carroll (1997) and have attracted substantial
attention in recent years.
We ￿nd that our calibrated model matches well important cross-sectional characteristics
of wealth and debt portfolios in the U.S. Against this background, we establish the following
quantitative results. Unsecured debtors hold small amounts of home equity in the equilibrium
of the calibrated model, as in the data. Thus, home equity does not provide informal
collateral for unsecured debt and hence does not mitigate the limited commitment problem
resulting from the bankruptcy option. This result has important implications for bankruptcy
regulation. Equilibrium pricing of unsecured debt and the associated portfolio choices imply
that homestead exemptions, which are an important part of U.S. bankruptcy regulation, have
a quantitatively small e⁄ect. Regulation could a⁄ect the quantity and price of unsecured
debt only if the size of the exemptions is very small (less than a tenth of annual labor
earnings). This ￿nding is in contrast to results in Pavan (2008), who did not explicitly
1See Dynan and Kohn (2007), Tudela and Young (2005), Jentzsch and San JosØ Riestra (2006) and their
references for descriptive facts on consumer credit in these countries.
1distinguish between secured and unsecured debt, but is consistent with the inconclusive
empirical evidence on the e⁄ect of homestead exemptions on debt and bankruptcy incidence
(see, for example, the survey in White, 2006).
Our paper relates to recent research by Athreya (2002), Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima
and R￿os-Rull (2007) and Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2007) who have extended the classic
heterogeneous-agent models to analyze unsecured debt. Importantly, these models assume
that consumers only have access to unsecured debt. In this paper we relax this assumption
and allow for an endogenous debt portfolio: consumers can take on secured debt such as
mortgages, which are collateralized by housing, and unsecured debt like credit-card debt.
To the best of our knowledge only Athreya (2006) attempts to distinguish secured and
unsecured debt but does not model housing wealth. In his model the amount of collateral
is exogenous whereas consumers in our model endogenously accumulate housing collateral
which also generates utility. This modeling of durables like housing is closest to FernÆndez-
Villaverde and Krueger (forthcoming), Kiyotaki, Michaelides and Nikolov (2011) and Yang
(2009) who, however, do not allow for equilibrium bankruptcy and unsecured debt.2
The main contribution of our paper is that we explicitly model debt portfolios. The
advantages of analyzing housing wealth, secured and unsecured debt simultaneously are at
least threefold. The ￿rst advantage is that the model has an additional margin of substitu-
tion in the debt portfolio, between secured and unsecured debt. That margin adds realism
by capturing the two types of debt which are relevant in consumer ￿nance. The margin also
gives households the choice to provide informal collateral for unsecured debt by holding home
equity above the amount which is exempt in bankruptcy procedures. This is particularly im-
portant when one investigates the supply-side e⁄ects of the limited commitment introduced
by the bankruptcy option. We will show how the joint analysis of housing wealth, secured
and unsecured debt in our quantitative framework generates new insights for the e⁄ect of
homestead exemptions on the equilibrium price and quantity of unsecured debt.
The second advantage is more realism in a key aspect of the analysis since most of
consumers￿total debt holdings in the data are secured by housing collateral. Thus, a quan-
titative model of household debt needs to explain not only the rather small unsecured debt
2See also Yao and Zhang (2005) for an analysis of housing and portfolio choice and Mankart and Rodano
(2009) for an analysis of bankruptcy and entrepreneurship.
2position but the whole debt portfolio. In our model the optimal choices for these portfolios
are constrained by endogenous debt limits for unsecured and secured debt. This is also
important for the predictions of the model concerning consumer bankruptcy because only
unsecured debt can be discharged by ￿ling for bankruptcy.
The third advantage is that the explicit modeling of housing introduces an endogenous
bankruptcy cost which has been neglected in previous quantitative research. Upon seizure
of owner-occupied housing, the home equity above the amount exempt in bankruptcy pro-
cedures is used to satisfy unsecured creditors￿claims. Since adjusting the housing stock
is costly, the cost of bankruptcy depends on the size of a consumer￿ s housing wealth and
secured debt.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present empirical facts
which are instructive for our analysis. We present the model in Section 3, followed by
its numerical solution and calibration in Section 4. In Section 5 we analyze the role of
home equity as informal collateral and the implications for bankruptcy regulation. We then
conclude in Section 6.
2 Empirical facts
In this section we summarize the empirical facts on wealth and debt portfolios which are
relevant for the quantitative application of our model. We then brie￿ y review the key features
of U.S. consumer bankruptcy regulation which the model shall capture.
2.1 Data
We use the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to present facts on wealth and debt portfolios
of U.S. consumers. The SCF has been widely used as it provides the most accurate infor-
mation on consumer ￿nances in the U.S. (see Kennickell, 2003, and the references therein).
We focus on the SCF 2004 to calibrate our model since, for the purposes of our analysis, it
is representative of the three waves of the SCF in the 2000s. We prefer the SCF 2004 to
the most recent SCF 2007 for the calibration since the 2007 SCF wave contains data from
interviews between May 2007 and March 2008 that are likely to be in￿ uenced by the start
3of the ￿nancial crisis.
We largely follow Budr￿a Rodr￿guez, D￿az-GimØnez, Quadrini and R￿os-Rull (2002) and
D￿az-GimØnez, Quadrini and R￿os-Rull (1997) in constructing measures for wealth and labor
earnings in the U.S. We account for di⁄erences in household size using the equivalence scale
reported in FernÆndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007), Table 1, last column, with a weight
of 1 for the ￿rst person in the household, 0.34 for the second person and approximately 0.3
for each additional member of the household. To make the empirical data comparable with
the data generated by the model, we normalize all variables by average net labor earnings
in the whole sample.3 More precisely, we use SCF data on gross labor earnings and the
NBER tax simulator described in Feenberg and Coutts (1993) to construct a measure for
disposable labor earnings after taxes and transfers for each household. Arguably, after-tax
rather than pre-tax earnings matter for households￿consumption and portfolio decisions
since some uninsurable labor earnings risk may be eliminated by redistributive taxes and
transfers. More detailed information on the de￿nition of the variables and the sample is
contained in the data appendix.
We focus on empirical facts for prime-age households with a head between ages 26 and
55. As Livshits et al. (2007), our model abstracts from death before age 76 and there-
fore this is a good approximation of the data only up to a certain age. Life tables for
the U.S. show that 90% of those born alive are still alive at age 55 and then have an av-
erage life expectancy of another 25 years (see the National Center of Health Statistics at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/life_tables.htm). Allowing for a positive probability of
death at all stages of the life cycle would unnecessarily increase the computational burden
further and since debt portfolios are most relevant early in the life cycle, as we will see below,
this simpli￿cation of our analysis seems not very restrictive.4
Since the questions in the SCF survey refer to income in the previous year and agents
have made their consumption and portfolio choices conditional on this income, we interpret
the SCF asset data as end-of-period information at the time when the survey is carried out.
3When computing the statistics in the data, we use the sampling weights provided in the SCF.
4Allowing for a positive probability of death and assuming accidental bequests, for example, would add a
￿xed-point problem in our numerical solution. This would be very costly given the substantial computational
burden of our model.




Housing wealth (primary residence) 3.38 3.48 2.50
+ Net-￿nancial assets 4.07 3.69 -0.01
= Total net worth (fraction of average net lab. earnings) 7.45 7.17 2.49
Financial assets
Financial assets 4.714 4.407 0.773
+ Secured debt -0.610 -0.688 -0.746
+ Unsecured debt -0.031 -0.033 -0.037
= Net-￿nancial assets (fraction of average net lab. earnings) 4.073 3.686 -0.010
Debt
Secured debt (in % of total secured + unsecured debt above) 95.16 95.42 95.27
Home ownership (in % of sample size) 66.91 67.43 64.40
Bankrupt in previous year (in % of sample size) 1.42 1.53 1.67
Table 1: Wealth and debt portfolios of households with a head between ages 26 and 55.
Sample means of cross-sections in the 2000s (2001-2007) and 2004, respectively. Means in
column (3) are computed for households up to the 90th percentile of the net worth distrib-
ution. Source: Authors￿calculation based on the SCF. Notes: Quantities are normalized by
average net labor earnings of the whole sample in the respective sample year.
2.2 Wealth and debt portfolios
Table 1 displays the means of wealth and debt for prime-age households denominated in
average net labor earnings in the respective survey year. Column (1) displays the average
of the means across the SCF surveys in the 2000s (the SCF 2001, 2004 and 2007) whereas
column (2) shows these averages only for the SCF 2004. The sample means are very similar
in both columns of Table 1. We thus focus on the SCF 2004, the last SCF wave before the
￿nancial crisis, when we calibrate our model which is not designed for analyzing such an
extreme event.
For the calibration we further restrict the sample to consumers up to the 90th percentile
of the net worth distribution. The reason is that, as is well known, standard incomplete-
market models cannot match the substantial wealth holdings in the top decile of the wealth
distribution (see, for example, Hintermaier and Koeniger, 2011, and the references therein).
If such a model were calibrated to match average wealth in the whole sample, the model
5would predict that consumers up to the 90th percentile hold too much wealth compared with
the data. Such a prediction bias is particularly undesirable given that the focus of this paper
is on debt portfolios. Table, column (3) shows that while the wealth holdings are obviously
smaller for consumers below the 90th percentile of the net worth distribution, most of the
other statistics are quite similar. The main di⁄erence is the much smaller ￿nancial asset
position compared with column (2). Such assets are held mostly by consumers in the top
decile of the net worth distribution.
Table 1, column (3) shows that average wealth of prime-age households below the 90th
percentile of the net worth distribution consists mostly of owner-occupied housing wealth
(for the primary residence). 64% of households own a home which can be used as collateral
to secure debt in real-life debt contracts. Secured debt accounts for 95% of the debt.5 As
to the incidence of debt, 46% of prime-age households below the 90th percentile of the net
worth distribution hold some debt, 39% hold secured debt and 13% hold unsecured debt.
Unsecured debt can be written o⁄ in bankruptcy procedures and 1.6% of the households
have made use of that option in the year previous to the survey date.
Since an important dimension of heterogeneity in our life-cycle model is age, Figures 1
and 2 illustrate how wealth and debt portfolios change with age in the SCF cross-section up
to the 90th percentile of the net worth distribution.6 Figure 1 shows that young consumers
start their life with very little equity, borrowing against their housing collateral. Figure 2
shows that most of the debt is secured and unsecured debt is mainly taken on by young
consumers. By their mid-thirties consumers, on average, reduce their debt and accumulate
signi￿cant amounts of other equity (see FernÆndez-Villaverde and Krueger, forthcoming, who
document similar patterns of ￿nancial assets and durables in the SCF 1995).
The data in the SCF also reveal some important patterns of di⁄erence between consumers
with and without unsecured debt, which we would like to capture with our model. Households
with unsecured debt are younger and have smaller labor earnings than the sample mean.
Moreover, they own less housing wealth while holding more secured debt than the rest of
5Constructing model counterparts for secured and unsecured debt in the data is not trivial. We refer to
the data appendix for details.
6We explain below how we compare the data cross-sections with the life-cycle pro￿les generated by the
model. To obtain the age cross-sections displayed in the ￿gures, we divide the range between ages 23 and 76
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Figure 1: Average portfolios of consumers between ages 26 and 55 up to 90th percentile of
the net worth distribution in the 2000s. Source: Authors￿calculations based on the Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF). See the data appendix for variable de￿nitions. Notes: The
unit is the average of net labor earnings in the whole SCF sample. The axis labeling for age
uses the midpoint of the age interval in the respective three-year age group. The graph plots
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Secured debt Unsecured debt
Figure 2: Average debt portfolio of consumers between ages 26 and 55 up to 90th percentile
of the net worth distribution in the 2000s. Source: Authors￿calculations based on the Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF). See the data appendix for variable de￿nitions. Notes: The
unit is the average of net labor earnings in the whole SCF sample. The axis labeling for age
uses the midpoint of the age interval in the respective three-year age group. The graph plots
the average for each age group.
8the sample. Thus consumers with unsecured debt have less home equity than the rest of the
sample.
2.3 U.S. consumer bankruptcy
The regulation for consumer bankruptcy in the U.S., relevant for the SCF 2004, is the
Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1978. This act contains two Chapters for non-farming households.
Consumers can choose to ￿le for personal bankruptcy under either Chapter 7 or Chapter
13. The main features of these two Chapters, which are important for our analysis, can be
summarized as follows (see Sullivan et al., 1999, for further details).
Under Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy act, the debtor can write o⁄his unsecured debts but
must surrender all his assets except for speci￿ed exempt amounts. Most of the bankruptcy
exemptions are speci￿ed as homestead exemptions (see, for example, Grant and Koeniger,
2009). Secured debt is senior and has to be honored, however, so that bankruptcy exemptions
only apply to the home equity which remains after servicing secured credit claims.7
Under Chapter 13, the debtor agrees to a repayment schedule for part or all of the debt
and retains his assets. The repayment plan usually is speci￿ed for three years but can take
up to ￿ve years. Importantly, the debtor cannot repay less under Chapter 13 than what
creditors would get paid under Chapter 7. Hence, we focus on Chapter 7 in our model since
it places a lower bound on the unsecured-debt claims of the creditors. This is not a strong
restriction since most consumers who ￿le for bankruptcy do so under Chapter 7 (70%) and
many of the repayment plans initiated under Chapter 13 fail and are later converted into
Chapter 7. If consumers ￿le for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, they are not allowed to ￿le for
bankruptcy again within the next six years (see Sullivan et al., 1999).
The main reason for consumer bankruptcy, identi￿ed by Sullivan et al. (2000), is earnings
risk. Two thirds of the bankrupt consumers mention job related problems like wage cuts or
unemployment. A ￿fth of bankrupt consumers reports health problems (multiple responses
were permitted) where in 60% of these cases the implied income losses due to missed work-
7Our model abstracts from house price risk and negative home equity so that we do not discuss the
regulation on mortgage foreclosures and bankruptcy. Data on charge-o⁄ and delinquency rates by the
Federal Reserve at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeo⁄/ show that real-estate loans have been
essentially secure before 2007 with charge-o⁄ and delinquency rates of less than a tenth of those of other
consumer loans.
9days, demotion or lost jobs are mentioned as the reason for bankruptcy. Therefore we focus
on labor earnings shocks as a reason for bankruptcy in this paper.8 Having presented the
key relevant facts, we are now ready to set up the model.
3 The model
We build on the life-cycle model of unsecured debt by Livshits et al. (2007). We assume
that the economy is populated by a large number of consumers, indexed by i, who live for
J = 18 periods, where each period j has a length of three years. Life begins at age 23 and
the ￿rst 14 periods (until age 65) are working periods in which people receive income shocks.
In the last four periods consumers are in retirement and face no uncertainty. Life ends after
age 76. Below we drop the index i for di⁄erent consumers to simplify notation unless the
distinction between consumers is particularly important.
Preferences. Consumers maximize expected lifetime utility. Utility is derived from a
consumption basket ￿(cj;fj) which is non-separable in non-durable consumption cj and the
service ￿ ow fj from housing. We assume that one unit of the housing stock, whether rented
or owned, provides ￿ units of this service ￿ ow. For the quantitative application of the model
we assume recursive utility since we want to have ￿ exibility in the calibration concerning
the strength of the intratemporal and intertemporal consumption smoothing motive. The
















with expectation operator E, discount factor ￿, risk aversion ￿ ￿ 0, intertemporal elasticity





8We abstract from medical expense shocks to contain the computational burden of our model with housing
as an additional endogenous state variable. See Chatterjee et al. (2007) or Livshits et al. (2007) for models
with health expense shocks.
10The parameter ￿ = 1 if the consumer owns housing and ￿ = ￿r with 0 ￿ ￿r ￿ 1 if the
consumer rents. As is common in the literature, the parameter ￿r allows us to capture
foregone utility of renters, for example due to hold-up problems which are left unmodelled.
We call ￿r rental e¢ ciency.
The speci￿cation of preferences implies that the demand for housing service ￿ ows may be
zero since consumers then rely on the constant autonomous level of the service ￿ ow f > 0,
which is assumed to be small and positive. Furthermore, consumers prefer an early resolution
of uncertainty if ￿ > 1=￿, as will be the case in our calibration.
Our parametric assumptions about preferences encompass many of the previous numerical
applications which we are aware of. The preferences would simplify to the standard CRRA
case if ￿ = ￿. Moreover, the Cobb-Douglas consumption basket is in line with empirical
evidence on the substitutability between housing and non-durables (see Davis and Ortalo-
MagnØ, 2011, and FernÆndez-Villaverde and Krueger, forthcoming, for further discussion and
references).
Labor earnings. The log of labor earnings of consumer i at age j is given by
lnyij = ￿j + zij,
where ￿j is the deterministic labor endowment of the household with age 23 + 3(j ￿ 1) at
the beginning of period j. The endowment ￿j is hump-shaped over the life cycle and zij is
a persistent income shock.
Assets and market arrangements. The stock of housing that creates the service ￿ ow
of utility can be either rented or owned. We denote the owned housing wealth by h. Owned
housing can be used as collateral to secure debt but can only be adjusted at a cost. Alter-
natively, housing can be rented at a price determined by a no-arbitrage condition. The price
of renting one unit of housing equals the user cost ra + ￿, where ra is the risk-free interest
rate on ￿nancial assets and ￿ is the rate at which housing depreciates.9
9As in Gervais (2002), we implicitly assume that ￿nancial institutions take on deposits and purchase
housing which they rent out. Thus, the interest rate on deposits ra enters the user cost .
11Consumers hold portfolios of secured debt as ￿ 0, unsecured debt au < 0, risk-free
￿nancial assets au ￿ 0 and owned housing wealth h. Secured debt is backed by owner-
occupied housing as collateral and bears an interest rate rs. Risk-free ￿nancial assets au ￿ 0
earn interest ra. We assume that there is a borrowing spread, rs > ra, due to a cost of
￿nancial intermediation. We further assume that the cost of intermediation is larger for
unsecured debt so that the interest rate for unsecured debt is at least ru > rs > ra. As we
discuss further when we calibrate the model, this is a common assumption which is realistic.
Unsecured debt au < 0 is not backed by collateral and we allow consumers to discharge
unsecured debt in bankruptcy procedures. Since creditors price the possibility of bankruptcy,
the interest rate on unsecured debt consists of the base rate ru and an endogenous risk
premium. We present the pricing of unsecured debt by ￿nancial intermediaries in detail
below.
Adjustment costs. Whereas ￿nancial assets as and au can be adjusted costlessly by the
consumer, we assume that the adjustment of owned housing h is costly. These costs can be
thought of as fees for real estate agents and generate realistic lumpy investment patterns for
housing. Moreover, it sharpens the distinction between owner-occupied housing and non-
durables in our model as adjustment costs are one key di⁄erence between these two types of
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f hj if h￿
j+1 < (1 ￿ ￿)hj
,
where the adjustment cost is allowed to be asymmetric in the direction of adjustment. We
attach asterisks to the portfolio choices to distinguish them from realizations after bank-
ruptcy choice. Note that in our speci￿cation of the adjustment cost function there is an
interval of choices h￿
j+1 for which no adjustment costs need to be paid. The end points of
this interval are the levels of housing if it depreciates and if it is fully maintained.10
10The numerical solution of the model will require discretization of choices. The above speci￿cation is
compatible with the existence of choices on the discretized grid for which no adjustment costs occur.
12State variables and the timing of choices. Each consumer enters the period with the
pair of endogenous state variables, net-￿nancial assets aj ￿ as
j + au
j and owned housing hj.
Two exogenous state variables are also relevant to the decision problem. These consist of the
state of current income yj and of a moving indicator mj. This exogenous moving indicator
determines if a consumer has to rent or if he can choose between either renting or owning the
home. As in D￿az and Luengo-Prado (2008), a plausible calibration of exogenous variation
in this moving indicator helps to capture realistic patterns of home ownership over the life
cycle.
Given the endogenous and exogenous states the consumer chooses consumption and the
asset portfolio. The asset returns accrue and the consumer enjoys utility before the new
realizations of the exogenous state variables, yj+1 and mj+1, are drawn. The consumer
then decides whether to declare bankruptcy. The law of motion of the pair of endogenous
state variables, aj+1 and hj+1 that enter the decision problem next period, depends on the
bankruptcy choice. We now characterize the constraints for the consumer choices and the
bankruptcy procedure in more detail before we formulate the recursive problem.
Collateral constraint. The amount of secured debt of the consumer is bounded by the
collateral constraint. Only owned housing net of adjustment costs can be used as collateral
to secure debt so that we specify the collateral constraint as
a
s￿





where ￿ is the exogenous maximum loan-to-value ratio imposed by the ￿nancial regulator.
If ￿ < 1 ￿ c
￿
f , the access to secured debt is more constrained than necessary to guarantee
repayment in the presence of adjustment costs.
Budget constraint. If the consumer is hit by a moving shock, mj = 1, the consumer
cannot own a home and thus cannot hold secured debt so that as￿
j+1 = h￿
j+1 = 0. The budget





























If the consumer holds unsecured debt, au￿





j+1), the exogenous state of current income yj and the bankruptcy ￿ ag Bj which
equals 1 if the consumer has declared bankruptcy in the previous period and 0 otherwise.
Since the moving shock is idiosyncratic and, unlike the income shock, not persistent, the price
qu
j (￿￿
j+1;yj;Bj) does not depend explicitly on the exogenous state mj. The moving indicator
mj a⁄ects prices, however, through the restrictions which it imposes on the portfolio choices
￿￿
j+1. We discuss the pricing of unsecured debt further below.
If mj = 1, the consumer can spend resources aj + hj + yj on non-durable consumption
cj, the ￿nancial asset au￿
j+1 and housing rental fj, where qh = 1=(1 ￿ ￿). Since the consumer
has to divest the housing stock, adjustment costs are ￿(0;hj).
If mj = 0, the consumer can choose between renting and owning. If the consumer rents,
















j+1;hj) + cj ￿ aj + hj + yj , (3)
where the expenditure on housing is qhh￿
j+1. In this case the owned housing wealth h￿
j+1
creates a service ￿ ow fj = h￿
j+1 and can be used as collateral for secured debt as￿
j+1 ￿ 0 with
a price qs
j = 1=(1 + rs).
Bankruptcy. At the time of bankruptcy ￿ling the consumer is obliged by law to reveal his
￿nancial status to the bankruptcy judge. In particular, the judge knows the amount of the
owned housing wealth h￿




the consumer has no unsecured debt which can be written o⁄ and bankruptcy is not an
option. The interesting case is when au￿
j+1 < 0. Since secured debt as￿
j+1 has priority and
needs to be paid irrespective of speci￿ed home exemption levels, the bankruptcy judge ￿rst
computes the amount of the owned housing wealth that remains after repaying all secured
debt. Note that for renters h￿
j+1 = as￿
j+1 = 0. The housing wealth which remains for repaying
14unsecured debt is
h







The judge then determines the maximum amount which could be divested from the remaining
housing wealth, given the exemption level hy speci￿ed in the bankruptcy regulation. That
amount is
￿
max net divestment = ￿max
￿
h




The housing wealth used to repay unsecured debt is then equal to that maximum amount
or less if the outstanding amount of unsecured debt is smaller:
h








As speci￿ed in the U.S. bankruptcy law, the judge only sells the home if some of the home
equity can be used to repay unsecured debt. Thus, the housing wealth which remains for






hleft for unsecured ￿ hto unsecured if ￿max net divestment < 0
h￿
j+1 if ￿max net divestment = 0
,






0 if ￿max net divestment < 0
as￿
j+1 if ￿max net divestment = 0
where the consumer starts afresh without unsecured debt.

























15The pricing of unsecured debt. The price of unsecured debt is determined by perfectly





j+1), the bankruptcy ￿ ag Bj and the age j of the consumer. As mentioned
above, the price qu
j (￿￿
j+1;yj;Bj) does not depend explicitly on the exogenous state mj since
the moving shock is idiosyncratic and not persistent as the income shock.
The intermediaries price unsecured debt forming expectations about the draws of future
income, the moving shock and the implied probability of bankruptcy. There is no cross-
subsidization across consumers so that consumers with di⁄erent portfolios, age or income
state may receive a di⁄erent interest quote.
De￿ning the probability of bankruptcy as ￿j(￿￿
j+1;yj;Bj), the zero-pro￿t condition implies



















where qu = 1=(1+ru). If the probability of bankruptcy is zero, ￿j(￿￿
j+1;yj;Bj) = 0, or if no




￿ ￿, then the risk
premium on unsecured debt is zero: qu
j (￿￿
j+1;yj;Bj) = qu. The probability of bankruptcy is
zero, for example, if the consumer has declared bankruptcy in the previous period so that
Bj = 1.
The recursive formulation with optimal default. The decision problems of a con-
sumer depend on the moving shock mj and on the bankruptcy decision in the previous
period. Being hit by a moving shock (mj = 1) implies the restriction on portfolio choice
h￿
j+1 = as￿
j+1 = 0. Having declared bankruptcy in the previous period restricts the bank-
ruptcy choice. This is consistent with the U.S. bankruptcy law which forbids consumers to
￿le for bankruptcy within six years after a previous bankruptcy procedure. Since a period
has a length of three years in our model, we assume that no bankruptcy can be declared for
one period.
16If the consumer is not hit by a moving shock, mj = 0, he can choose whether to own or









denotes the envelope of the value function when renting, V r
j (aj;hj;yj), and the value function
when owning the home, V o
j (aj;hj;yj). The value function
V
B








denotes the envelope of the value functions for renting V
r;B
j (aj;hj;yj) and owning V
o;B
j (aj;hj;yj)
if the consumer has declared bankruptcy in the previous period. If the consumer is hit by a








j (aj;hj;yj), V o
j (aj;hj;yj) and V
o;B
j (aj;hj;yj) are obtained.
Let !j denote the probability of a moving shock mj = 1 at age j. The value of renting
is V r
j if no bankruptcy has been declared in the previous period:
V
r
















































where E is the expectation operator and 0 ￿   ￿ 1 is an exogenous utility cost of
bankruptcy. This can be interpreted as psychological pain or stigma (see Athreya, 2004).11
11In Athreya (2004) a penalty   ￿ 0 is subtracted from the value function. With recursive preferences we
let 0 ￿   ￿ 1 enter multiplicatively to ensure that the maximum value, computed in the expectation in (7),
is positive.
17The value of renting is V
r;B
j if bankruptcy has been declared in the previous period:
V
r;B







































Note that this type of consumer no longer has the option to declare bankruptcy in the current
period.
Recalling that fj = h￿
j+1 for owners, the value of owning is V o
j if no bankruptcy has been
declared in the previous period:
V
o


































































subject to (1) and (3).
The value of owning is V
o;B
j if bankruptcy has been declared in the previous period:
18V
o;B





















































subject to (1) and (3).
Note that the decision problem of the owner contains the collateral constraint (1).
Equations (7) and (9) show that the costs of bankruptcy are di⁄erent for owners and
renters. Both renters and owners are excluded from the option to declare bankruptcy and
face an exogenous utility cost of bankruptcy  . In addition, owners have to pay adjustment
costs for forced home sales in the bankruptcy procedure, in situations where the housing
stock after repaying secured debt exceeds the bankruptcy exemption, hleft for unsecured > hy.
The magnitude of the endogenous bankruptcy cost depends on the size of the owned house
and is relevant for our later analysis of home equity as informal collateral and repayment
commitment.
Equations (8) and (10) illustrate that we do not assume that consumers are excluded
from credit markets after bankruptcy. This assumption is often imposed in models with
unsecured debt to make bankruptcy costly enough. Since we have endogenous bankruptcy
costs related to owned housing and the exclusion from the option to declare bankruptcy, we
do not need this assumption which is at odds with empirical evidence on consumer borrowing
after bankruptcy procedures.
Equilibrium de￿nition. A recursive competitive equilibrium is characterized by the pol-
icy functions for non-durable consumption, the portfolio choices and optimal default so that
for given prices {ra;rs} of risk-free assets and secured debt:
(i) the envelope of value functions Vj (aj;hj;yj) and V B
j (aj;hj;yj) attains its maximal
19value if mj = 0, and the envelope of value functions V r
j (aj;hj;yj) and V
r;B
j (aj;hj;yj)
attains its maximal value if mj = 1.
(ii) the pricing scheme for unsecured debt qu
j (￿￿
j+1;yj;Bj) satis￿es the zero-pro￿t condition
(6), with default probabilities ￿j(￿￿
j+1;yj;Bj) being determined by optimal default.
Having presented the model and its recursive formulation we now solve the model nu-
merically and calibrate it to match wealth and debt portfolios in the U.S.
4 Calibration and numerical results
The discrete choice in the bankruptcy decision and the presence of non-convex adjustment
costs imply that we cannot use numerical algorithms for the constrained portfolio choice prob-
lem which rely on the di⁄erentiability of the value function as in Hintermaier and Koeniger
(2010). Thus, we discretize portfolio choices and specify an equi-spaced grid for as 2 [￿7:5;0]
and au 2 [￿3;0], with a distance between gridpoints of 0:22 in terms of annual average labor
earnings. For au 2 [0;90] we choose the same grid ￿neness at 0 but let the distance between
gridpoints increase linearly for larger values of au in order to economize on computation time.
This results in 35 and 54 gridpoints for as and au, respectively. Choosing equi-spaced grids
for debt as < 0 and au < 0 ensures that consumers remain on the grid of possible values
for the endogenous state variable a = as+ au with 88 gridpoints where a 2 [￿7:5;90]. We
then specify the grid for the second endogenous state variable h 2 [0;45] with 148 gridpoints
where the grid for h is chosen to include the bankruptcy exemption value hy and the values
of h implied by the grid for secured debt as at the collateral constraint (1).12 We check
that, for the speci￿ed grid, among the feasible housing choices there are choices for which no
adjustment costs are incurred. We make sure that widening the bounds of the grid further
does not a⁄ect the results. Finally, the benchmark calibration allows for 5 Markov states
12The grid for the rental choices is speci￿ed identically. We have checked that the results for the benchmark
calibration are robust if we increase the number of gridpoints to 71 gridpoints for as, 113 gridpoints for au,
with a distance between gridpoints of 0:11 in terms of annual average labor earnings, resulting in 183
gridpoints for a and 184 gridpoints for h. Due to the curse of dimensioniality, resulting both from a larger
state space and choice set, computing time increased roughly by factor 10.
20of the stochastic component of labor earnings, while we have checked the robustness of our
benchmark results for 11 Markov states.
Since solving the model takes 13 hours on a PC of the current computing vintage using
Fortran code, we do not perform a full grid search over the whole parameter space in our
calibration. We solve the model in some regions of the parameter space, which we consider
plausible, and then use the interpolation method of Kriging to check whether we can improve
the model predictions in other parts of the parameter space.
Kriging is a geostatistical technique which, under certain assumptions, computes the best
linear unbiased prediction for target statistics via interpolation on the parameter space and is
closely related to regression analysis.13 Kriging has been used substantially in geostatistical
sciences and has not been applied much in Economics, to the best of our knowledge. Since
solving our model on the whole parameter space is prohibitively costly (as is drilling for oil
everywhere on the planet in the geostatistical applications), the method is naturally applied
in calibration exercises in order to predict model statistics at parameter combinations for
which the model has not been explicitly solved and simulated.
4.1 Numerical algorithm
We start with the last period J. In that period a consumer cannot declare bankruptcy
and optimally chooses consumption and the asset portfolio. Note that adjustment costs
and the possibility to collateralize owned housing imply that for some parameter values
it is not optimal for the consumer to sell all assets before death. We then compute the
available resources, with and without ￿ling for bankruptcy in the previous period, on the





functions allow us to determine those realizations for next period income and moving shocks
for which a consumer with a given portfolio declares bankruptcy, i.e., (1￿ )V B
J￿1 > VJ￿1 or
(1￿ )V
r;B
J￿1 > V r
J￿1. We then compute the price of unsecured debt for all income states and
feasible choices before we solve the maximization problem of the consumer to determine the
13See the description of the Matlab Kriging toolbox by Lophaven, Nielsen and Słndergaard (2002) for
further references, which is available at http://www2.imm.dtu.dk/~hbn/dace/.
14Since the amount of owned housing after bankruptcy would in general fall o⁄ the discretized grid, we
convexify the value function using a weighted average of the value function at the two neighboring gridpoints,
with weights that depend on the distance to the point which is o⁄ the grid.
21optimal choices. We continue with analogous computations for the previous period J ￿ 2
and so on until the beginning of life.
We use the model solution to simulate a population of 100,000 consumers whose initial
exogenous and endogenous states at the beginning of life are determined in the following
way. The stochastic income component is randomly drawn from the stationary income
distribution and the initial conditions for owned housing and net-￿nancial assets are drawn
from the sample distribution of consumers with ages 23-25 in the SCF, applying the sampling
weights provided in the SCF.15
4.2 Comparing the simulation output with SCF data
We make the output of the life-cycle model comparable across all cohorts which are observed
in a speci￿c SCF cross-section. This is achieved by reversing the correction for average income
growth used for the calibration of the deterministic life-cycle earnings pro￿le described in the
appendix. We divide by the growth factor 1:01(age￿base age) where base age is the reference
age for which no adjustment is necessary. In our model with income growth, this ensures that
the unit of output of the life-cycle model is shrunk for cohorts which are relatively older at
the time of survey. We then apply the relevant cohort weights from the SCF to replicate the
age structure of the population surveyed. Synthesizing surveys from the simulated model
this way guarantees that the implied statistics are directly comparable to those from the
observed SCF data.
4.3 Calibration
4.3.1 Income before and after retirement
We now explain how we calibrate the income process using the SCF 2004.16 As is standard
in the literature (see, for example, Yang, 2009, or Kaplan and Violante, 2010), consumers in
our model are exposed to earnings shocks before retirement. We thus calibrate a stochastic
15We draw from more than 100,000 observations since we discard those few observations for consumers
whose draw for the initial endowments would imply an empty budget set in the equilibrium of the model.
16We do not to use estimates for income processes based on PSID panel data because the PSID sample
generates too little inequality in net worth. As mentioned above, the earnings dispersion observed in the
SCF is larger than in other surveys that do not attempt to provide accurate data on the wealth distribution.
22income process for the period before retirement in the life cycle and calibrate the individual-
speci￿c retirement bene￿ts based on the U.S. social security system for the retirement period.
The log of earnings yij of individual i at age j before retirement is additively separable
in a deterministic age polynomial ￿j and an idiosyncratic income shock zij so that
lnyij = ￿j + zij , (11)
where the shock zij follows an AR(1) process
zij = ￿zi;j￿1 + "ij. (12)
After retirement there are no income shocks and each individual receives retirement bene￿ts
from social security. We refer to the appendix for further details about the calibration of the
income process.
4.3.2 Mobility shocks
The calibration of the age-dependent mobility shocks uses the moving rates from the Current
Population Survey 2005 reported in D￿az and Luengo-Prado (2008), Table 2. The moving
rate for our triennial periods is constructed with the one-year moving rate and the annualized
￿ve-year moving rate. Since some of the renting activity is endogenous in our model, the
moving shocks should capture only the exogenous component. Thus, we downward adjust
the moving rates from the CPS using survey answers on the reason to move for exogenous
￿non-housing reasons￿ , as in D￿az and Luengo-Prado (2008). The resulting moving rate
captures moves due to unexpected changes in the family structure or natural disasters and
is 50% of the total rate. The probability of moving within a 3-year period falls with age,
from 0:32 at age 23 to 0:05 at age 71.
4.3.3 Benchmark parameters.
Table 2 displays the parameter values which we calibrate for our numerical solution. For

















Interest rates ra 0.04
rs 0.05
ru 0.055
Table 2: Benchmark parameters for the calibrated numerical solution. Notes: The unit for
hy is the average of annual net labor earnings. Annualized parameters.
The adjustment costs are speci￿ed symmetrically for upward and downward adjustments
and are assumed to equal 2.5% of the stock, consistent with typical fees charged by real-
estate brokers in the U.S. (D￿az and Luengo-Prado, 2010). These adjustment costs per
se would imply that the consumer can use at most 97.5% of the housing stock to secure
debt. Given the information of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) on real
estate lending standards and supervisory loan-to-value limits, we calibrate access to secured
consumer credit as slightly more restrictive with a loan-to-value ratio of 95%, ￿ = 0:95.17
The parameters for the bankruptcy procedure are set as follows. We set the value of
the exempt home equity amounts equal to two ￿fths of average annual labor earnings which
shall approximate the homestead exemption in the U.S. although there is signi￿cant variation
across U.S. states (Athreya, 2006). As we will discuss further below, the size of the exemption
has little e⁄ect on our results in strong contrast to Athreya (2006) or Pavan (2008) who do
not analyze housing wealth, secured and unsecured debt jointly.
As in Livshits et al. (2007), we assume a small-open economy and set the annual risk-
free lending rate to 4%. We assume a small transaction cost for debt so that the secured
17Information about supervisory loan-to-value limits is available at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/2000-8700.html
24borrowing rate is 5% and the unsecured borrowing rate without the risk premium ru is 5.5%.
As we will see below, positive bankruptcy incidence in equilibrium implies an additional
endogenous risk premium for unsecured debt. Allowing for interest spreads in the model is
supported by empirical evidence in Davis, Kubler and Willen (2006), historical interest-rate
data of the Federal Reserve (Table H.15) and is similar to assumptions in Athreya (2006)
and Livshits et al. (2007).18
For the preference parameters, we set f= 0:01, a small and quantitatively negligible value,
which allows consumers to consume no housing. We calibrate the remaining preference
parameters ￿,￿, ￿, ￿, ￿r and   to match the average statistics for the wealth and debt
portfolio and the home ownership rate for households up to the 90th percentile of the net
worth distribution. The reason is that, as mentioned in Section 2.2, standard incomplete-
market models cannot match the substantial wealth holdings in the top decile of the wealth
distribution. Calibrating such a model to match average wealth in the whole sample would
worsen the ￿t of the model for consumers up to the 90th percentile. These consumers would
hold more wealth than observed the data, a prediction bias which is undesirable given that
the focus of this paper is on debt portfolios.
Table 3 shows that for ￿ = 0:956, ￿ = 0:76, 1=￿ = 0:55, ￿ = 2, ￿r = 0:95 and   = 0:04 the
model matches the data targets well. The parameter values for patience, the weight of non-
durable consumption in the consumption index, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
and risk aversion are within the range of commonly calibrated values. Rental e¢ ciency ￿r =
0:95 helps to attain a realistic home ownership rate and the utility bankruptcy penalty   =
0:04 allows us to generate empirically observed unsecured debt holdings for renters. For   =
0, unsecured debt would be prohibitively expensive for renters. Given that the preferences
are homogeneous of degree 1,   = 0:04 can interpreted as a 4% smaller consumption basket.
Concerning the incidence of bankruptcy reported in Table 3, we adjust the data target
for bankruptcy reported in the SCF 2004 downward to 1.1% (1:67 ￿ 2=3) since job-related
shocks trigger bankruptcy in our model and two thirds of the bankruptcies are job related
(Sullivan et al., 2000). The calibrated model predicts a smaller bankruptcy incidence of
0.4%, more similar to the data target for bankruptcy of 0.5% in Chatterjee et al. (2007).
18The Table H.15 is available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/
25SCF 2004 Model
Variable (1) (2)
Housing wealth (as fraction of net lab. earnings) 2.50 2.57
Net-￿nancial assets (as fraction of net lab. earnings) -0.01 -0.01
Secured debt (as fraction of net lab. earnings) -0.75 -0.64
Unsecured debt (as fraction of net lab. earnings) -0.04 -0.03
Financial assets (as fraction of net lab. earnings) 0.77 0.66
Home ownership (% of sample) 64.4 66.7
Job-related bankruptcy (% of sample)￿ 1.1 0.4
Table 3: Averages of the targets in the data and the model. Source: Authors￿calculations
based on the SCF and the model. Notes: *Bankruptcy incidence of 1.67 % in the data is
multiplied by 2/3 for the fraction of job-related bankruptcies as reported in Sullivan et al.
(2000). The unit is the average of net labor earnings.
This positive incidence of bankruptcy in equilibrium implies an average risk premium for
unsecured debt of 2.1 percentage points. In addition to the results reported in Table 3, the
model matches the incidence of debt rather well: 56% of consumers hold debt compared
with 46% in the data, 46% hold secured debt compared with 39% in the data and 14% hold
unsecured debt compared with 13% in the data. Finally, our model reproduces the empirical
facts that consumers with unsecured debt are younger, have smaller labor earnings than the
sample mean, own smaller but non-negligible amounts of housing wealth than the rest of the
sample with substantial amounts of secured debt written against this collateral.
4.4 Life-cycle pro￿les and cross-sectional age pro￿les
After describing the calibration of the model and its ability to match our target statistics
in the data, we now present the implications of our calibration for the cross-sectional age
pro￿les which are observed in the SCF. These pro￿les have not been targeted explicitly
by our calibration and thus give us a further indication of the model ￿t of the data. We
￿rst present the life-cyle pro￿les of the model for the whole sample before computing the
cross-sectional age pro￿les for our sample of interest: prime-age consumers up to the 90th
percentile of the net worth distribution.
Figure 3 displays the average life-cycle pro￿les of interest for a simulated population




























































































































Figure 3: Life-cycle pro￿les predicted by the model. Source: Authors￿calculations based on
the model. Note: The unit is the average of net labor earnings.
27of 100,000 consumers between ages 26 and 76.19 Non-durable consumption increases over
the life cycle together with average earnings and housing wealth in our incomplete-markets
life-cycle model. Financial assets display the familiar tent shape over the life cycle whereas
housing wealth is hump-shaped. The home ownership rate steadily increases over the life-
cycle before consumers sell their owned housing wealth at the end of life. Unsecured debt is
largest (in absolute terms) for young consumers and then decreases with age.20 Secured debt
￿rst increases (in absolute terms) with age, then decreases before retirement, and increases
again during the retirement period. As expected, consumers substantially reduce their home
equity and ￿nancial assets during retirement. Home equity, that is housing wealth net of
secured debt, drops by a large amount in the penultimate period when much of the ￿nancial
assets have been depleted already.
These rather pronounced patterns towards the end of the retirement period clearly result
from the assumption of a ￿nite life. In particular, the patterns of asset decumulation depend
on the calibrated values for adjustment costs and rental e¢ ciency. Although the focus of
this paper is not on explaining debt and wealth portfolios during retirement, we calibrate a
more gradual reduction of home ownership in the retirement period to check that the model
predictions for prime-age consumers are robust. Since this calibration requires di⁄erent
parameters for rental e¢ ciency or adjustment costs during retirement compared with the
rest of life, we prefer our simpler calibration.
After presenting the life-cycle pro￿les, we are now interested in how the cross-sectional
age pro￿les predicted by the model compare with the observed SCF cross-sections for our
sample of interest. Figure 4 displays the average cross-sectional age pro￿les for consumers
between ages 26 and 55 up to the 90th percentile of the net worth distribution in the model
(the solid graphs) and SCF data (the dashed graphs).21 In order to compare the life-cycle
19At age 23 consumers start with a random draw from the SCF-data distribution of housing wealth and
net-￿nancial assets and a random draw for the income shock.
20The non-monotonic behavior of unsecured debt at age 60 is related to the last income shock before
retirement which is ￿permanent￿ . The last shock determines retirement income (see the appendix on the
calibration of the income process) and some consumers ￿nd it attractive to insure against this shock by
holding unsecured debt which can be written o⁄ if bankruptcy is declared. Indeed, we observe a spike in the
bankruptcy incidence in the period of the last income shock (1% of consumers declare bankruptcy in the last
period before retirement). The bankruptcy incidence then falls to zero during the retirement period when
there is no more income uncertainty.
21Note that in the model, as for the average SCF statistics in Table 1, conditioning on consumers up to
















































































































































Figure 4: Cross-sectional age pro￿les predicted by the model (solid graph) and the data
(dashed graph) for prime-age consumers with ages 26￿ 55 up to the 90th percentile of the
net worth distribution. Source: Authors￿calculations based on the model and the Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF) 2004. Notes: The unit is the average of net labor earnings.
The bankruptcy incidence in the data is multiplied by 2/3 for the fraction of job-related
bankruptcies as reported in Sullivan et al. (2000). See the data appendix for variable
de￿nitions.
29model output with the SCF cross-section data, we have adjusted the simulation output of the
model accounting for cohort e⁄ects resulting from income growth (see Section 4.2). Figure 4
shows that the cross-sectional age pro￿les predicted by the model match the SCF data pro￿les
remarkably well: home ownership rates, owner-occupied housing wealth and ￿nancial assets
increase between ages 26 and 55, whereas secured and unsecured debt decrease between
ages 26 and 55 in absolute terms. Noting the di⁄erent scale for secured and unsecured
in Figure 4, the model predicts that debt is mostly secured as in the data. Moreover, we
￿nd that about a third of young consumers with housing wealth at the beginning of life is
at the collateral constraint. For the relevant parameters which produce a quantitative ￿t
of the facts, consumers close to, or at, the collateral constraint with little housing equity
hold the more expensive unsecured debt. Most consumers repay their unsecured debt and
the bankruptcy incidence falls between ages 26 and 55 both in the model and the data.
The model predicts somewhat more bankruptcies for young consumers than the SCF data
which may not be of major concern, however, given that the cross-sectional age pro￿le for
bankruptcy is quite noisily measured in the data.
4.5 Sensitivity analysis
Given the good ￿t of the model with the SCF data, we perform three experiments in order
to better understand the model. We compute special cases of the model in which consumers
do not have access to secured debt, unsecured debt and the bankruptcy option, respectively.
This will help to understand the importance of the debt instruments and the bankruptcy
option in the model for intratemporal and intertemporal consumption smoothing. Moreover,
the experiments provide intuition for the role of home equity as informal collateral which is
of major interest in this paper.
Preferences in our model imply consumption smoothing across states and across time. We
compute the variance of the logarithm of the consumption basket (including rented or owned
housing wealth) as an indicator for intratemporal consumption smoothing and average total
debt (the sum of secured and unsecured debt) as an indicator for the extent of intertemporal
consumption smoothing. Figure 5 displays the results for these indicators for the benchmark
























































































Figure 5: The variance of the log consumption basket, average debt and home equity for the
benchmark and three experiments. Source: Authors￿calculations based on the model. Notes:
The unit is the average of net labor earnings. Debt is the sum of secured and unsecured
debt. Home equity is housing wealth net of secured debt.
31In our benchmark calibration the variance of the log consumption basket, plotted as the
solid graph, has a concave shape for consumers between ages 26 and 55, as in the model
without housing and secured debt in Livshits et al. (2007), Figure 3B. If agents do not have
access to unsecured debt, the variance of the log consumption basket, plotted as the dash-
dotted graph, increases by up to 0.1 for young consumers compared with the benchmark
calibration. This is a sizeable increase of the variance by 25%. After age 40, the variance is
very similar to the benchmark. As illustrated in the graph for total debt, young consumers
take on less total debt (in absolute terms) to smooth consumption if they do not have access
to unsecured debt and can only borrow against housing collateral. Unsecured debt is thus
important for young consumers to smooth consumption across states and time.
If the consumer has no bankruptcy option, total debt (plotted as the dotted graph in
Figure 5) increases substantially in absolute terms due to an increase in unsecured debt.22
We ￿nd that full repayment commitment reduces the risk premium on unsecured debt and
thus allows consumers to smooth consumption more cheaply intertemporally. The e⁄ect
on intratemporal consumption smoothing is unclear, however, since bankruptcy allows to
smooth consumption after the realization of bad income states. We ￿nd that the variance of
the log consumption basket decreases for young consumers and increases after age 40 com-
pared with the benchmark case, similar to results reported in Livshits et al. (2007), Figure
3B. Interestingly, Figure 5 also shows that home equity decreases if there is no bankruptcy
option and thus full repayment commitment: both housing wealth and secured debt decrease
in absolute terms but housing wealth decreases more strongly. At ￿rst glance, one might be
tempted to read this ￿nding as pointing to a potential role of home equity as informal collat-
eral. The next section demonstrates, however, that home equity does not provide informal
collateral in our quantitative model.
If the consumer has no access to secured debt, average owned housing wealth falls nearly
by the same amount so that average home equity is very close to the benchmark case. In
Figure 5 this is illustrated by the dashed and the solid graph. Since the home ownership rate
falls from 67% to 39%, this home equity is held by a much smaller fraction of consumers so
22The case with no bankruptcy option is implemented by setting   = 1. This implies that the value is zero
if bankruptcy is declared, which is strictly smaller than the strictly positive value under repayment. Thus,
the max-operator in equations (7) and (9) is redundant and the problem is equivalent to a problem without
a bankruptcy option.
32that the home equity per owner is larger if there is no access to secured debt. Lack of access
to secured debt implies that housing wealth equals home equity. This makes bankruptcy
less attractive for owners who have ￿nanced their housing purchase with debt, since home
equity is much larger than the exempt level in bankruptcy procedures for most owners.
Indeed, consumers no longer declare bankruptcy in equilibrium in the model case without
secured debt. Although all debt is unsecured debt in this case, banks are willing to lend
unsecured debt so that average total debt is very similar to the benchmark case. Moreover,
the age pro￿le of the variance of the log-consumption basket is qualitatively similar to the
case without a bankruptcy option, where the variance in the case without secured debt is
quantitatively larger after age 40. In Figure 5 this illustrated by the dashed and the dotted
graph.
5 Commitment by home equity?
Compared with the existing literature a new feature of our model is the joint analysis of
housing wealth, secured and unsecured debt since we do not fully consolidate the household
balance sheet by computing a single measure of net worth. As we will see, the joint analysis
a⁄ords new insights for the quantitative importance of committing by using home equity as
informal collateral.
Home equity provides informal collateral for unsecured debt if home equity, net of adjust-
ment cost, is above the exemption level hy = 0:405. In this case unsecured creditors receive
some repayment since the bankruptcy judge will sell housing wealth in order to repay some
of the unsecured debt. Thus, home equity above the exemption level hy makes bankruptcy
less attractive for consumers, also because of the wasteful adjustment costs, and allows them
cheaper access to unsecured debt since banks realize that home equity above the exemption
level hy provides informal collateral.
To gauge the quantitative importance of home equity as informal collateral in our model,
Figure 6 plots the price for unsecured debt in our benchmark calibration as a function
of unsecured debt for di⁄erent values of housing wealth. As an example, we plot graphs
for young consumers at ages 26￿ 28 in the fourth income state. Since consumers who hold
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Figure 6: The price of unsecured debt as a function of unsecured debt for di⁄erent housing
wealth. Source: Authors￿calculations based on the model. Notes: Prices are per annum for
consumers who are at the collateral constraint in the fourth income state at ages 26￿ 28. The
unit of unsecured debt is the average of annual net labor earnings.
34unsecured debt are at, or close to, the collateral constraint in our calibration, the graphs
in Figure 6 are plotted for portfolio choices of housing wealth h￿
j+1 and secured debt as￿
j+1




Figure 6 shows that the price for unsecured debt falls with the volume of unsecured debt
held by a consumer. Not surprisingly, this is due to the risk premium for unsecured debt
which increases with the amount of unsecured debt. In fact, the price for unsecured debt is
zero at large levels of unsecured debt, thus pinning down the borrowing limit endogenously.
What is remarkable in Figure 6 is that the pricing function remains the same across very
di⁄erent levels of housing wealth.
The intuition for this quantitative result is the following. Consumers with unsecured debt
at the collateral constraint hold very little home equity, net of adjustment costs. Given that
￿ = 0:95 < 1 ￿ c
￿
f = 0:975 in our calibration, home equity net of adjustment costs equals
0:025￿h￿
j+1. For this equity to be larger than the exempt amount hy = 0:405, in which case
housing wealth would provide informal collateral, housing wealth needs to be larger than
0:405=0:025 = 16:2. In the equilibrium of our benchmark calibration, however, consumers
with unsecured debt hold housing wealth which is smaller than 2:4. Hence, home equity is
not large enough in our calibration to reduce the exposure for banks and increase repayment
commitment in equilibrium.
Our ￿nding that housing wealth does not provide much informal collateral for unsecured
debt is quantitative. In general, consumers with unsecured debt do not necessarily need to
be at, or close to, the collateral constraint. Consumers with higher risk aversion, for example,
would value the state contingency of unsecured debt more. Higher risk aversion, however,
would worsen the match between the model and the data.23 Figure 7 shows that consumers
with unsecured debt in the SCF data indeed hold less home equity than other consumers,
as predicted by our calibrated model.
23This result relates to the literature on the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 2008) in which
implausibly high levels of risk aversion are needed, even in models with incomplete markets, to generate
the observed large equity premium. A related ￿nding in this literature is that with a large equity premium
implausibly high levels of risk aversion are needed to generate realistic consumer portfolios with rather small
shares of positive risky assets (Heaton and Lucas, 1997). In our model with debt portfolios, however, high
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Figure 7: The cumulative distribution function of home equity for prime-age consumers with
and without unsecured debt. Source: Authors￿calculations based on the SCF 2004. Notes:
The functions are plotted for home equity in the interval [0;10]. The unit of home equity is
the average of annual net labor earnings.
5.1 Implications for bankruptcy regulation
The small quantitative role of home equity as informal collateral and repayment commitment
in the equilibrium of our calibrated model has interesting implications for the relevance of
exemption levels that are speci￿ed in U.S. bankruptcy regulation. Previous research by Pavan
(2008) has argued that home equity provides informal collateral for unsecured credit so that
home equity exemptions, for example, make the supply of unsecured credit more costly. A
key di⁄erence with our paper is that we explicitly model debt portfolios of unsecured and
secured debt and that consumers derive utility from the stock of housing wealth rather than
home equity.
Table 4 shows that the amount of home equity, that is exempt in bankruptcy procedures,
does not a⁄ect the equilibrium much in our calibrated model, unless the exemption is very
small: the results reported in columns (2) to (7) are quantitatively very similar. The results
in column (1) show, however, that it matters for the equilibrium whether there exists a
positive bankruptcy exemption. A very small positive exemption level su¢ ces to reduce the
repayment commitment substantially, and to a⁄ect the price schedules for unsecured debt
36(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variable / Exemption level hy = 0 0:1 0:2
Benchmark
model: 0:405 1 5 10
Unsecured debt -0.40 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(fraction of net lab. earnings)
Risk premium on interest 0 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.5
(in percentage points)
Job-related bankruptcy 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
(in percent)
Table 4: Equilibrium e⁄ect of the bankruptcy exemption. Source: Authors￿calculations
based on the model. Notes: The unit is the average of net labor earnings.
so that much less unsecured debt is held in equilibrium.
The intuition is that for ￿ < 1￿c
￿
f , as in our calibration, and hy = 0 the judge will always
sell the housing wealth if bankruptcy is declared. This is because ￿ < 1 ￿ c
￿
f implies that
home equity net of adjustment costs is always positive, even if very small for many consumers,
and thus strictly larger than hy = 0. Thus, declaring bankruptcy is less attractive if hy = 0
due to the wasted adjustment costs. Moreover, the exposure of banks is smaller since they
always recover a strictly positive payment if consumers declare bankruptcy.
The results in Table 4 show that an exemption as small as a tenth of annual labor earnings,
hy = 0:1, almost restores the equilibrium of the benchmark in column (4). The reason is
that home equity net of adjustment costs is very small for many consumers so that a small
exemption of hy = 0:1 eliminates the informal collateral. This increases the exposure of banks
since they do not recover any resources from these consumers in bankruptcy procedures.
Importantly, it also reduces the repayment commitment implied by the wasteful adjustment
costs since, unlike in column (1), the judge no longer always sells housing wealth in the
bankruptcy procedures.
The ￿nding that the value of positive bankruptcy exemptions matters little for the equi-
librium is consistent with the rather inconclusive existing empirical evidence on the e⁄ect
of home equity exemptions in bankruptcy procedures on debt, wealth accumulation and
bankruptcy incidence in the U.S. (see for example White, 2006, Section 7.4, and references
therein). Data on homestead exemptions in the U.S. compiled by Athreya (2006), Table 1,
show that only four of the U.S. states have homestead exemptions below a tenth of annual
37labor earnings. As Table 4 shows, exemption levels above a tenth of annual labor earnings
do not a⁄ect the equilibrium, as illustrated in columns (2) to (7).
6 Conclusion
We introduced a model in which consumers hold portfolios of secured and unsecured debt.
The model quantitatively explains important characteristics of wealth and debt portfolios
for prime-age consumers in the U.S. We ￿nd that consumers with unsecured debt hold small
amounts of home equity in the calibrated model and in SCF data, so that home equity does
not provide much informal collateral for unsecured debt. As a consequence, observed varia-
tions in homestead exemptions, which are an important part of U.S. bankruptcy regulation,
matter very little for access to unsecured credit and the debt portfolio.
In future research it would be interesting to relax some of the assumptions made to
contain the computational burden in this paper. Allowing for health risk or longevity risk
may improve the predictions of the model for asset holdings during retirement. Introducing
aggregate price risk for housing wealth into the model, albeit challenging, would allow to
investigate the relevance of our analysis for more recent macroeconomic episodes.
Appendices
Data appendix
This data appendix describes how we construct data counterparts for the wealth and debt
portfolio as well as labor earnings in the model, using data from the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF). We construct all variables for the full SCF sample and then apply the
sample-selection criteria mentioned below.
Gross labor income is the sum of wage and salary income. As in Budr￿a Rodr￿guez
et al. (2002) we add a fraction of the business income where this fraction is the aver-
age share of labor income in total income in the SCF. Disposable labor income is com-
puted using the NBER tax simulator. We use the programs by Kevin Moore provided on
http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/ to construct disposable labor earnings for each household in
38the respective SCF wave. Following the standardized instructions on the NBER website, we
feed the following required SCF data into the NBER tax simulator: the U.S. state (where
available, otherwise we use the average of the state tax payments across states), marital sta-
tus, number of dependents, taxpayers above age 65 and dependent children in the household,
wage income, dividend income, interest and other property income, pensions and gross social
security bene￿ts, non-taxable transfer income, rents paid, property tax, other itemized de-
ductions, unemployment bene￿ts, mortgage interest paid, short and long-term capital gains
or losses. We then divide the resulting federal and state income tax payments as well as fed-
eral insurance contributions of each household by the household￿ s gross total income in the
SCF. This yields the implicit average tax rate for each household. The mean of that average
tax rate for consumers in the working age 23-64 in the SCF 2004 is 21.5%. Finally, we use
the average tax rate of each household in the respective SCF wave to compute household
disposable labor income as (1 - household average tax rate) * household gross labor income
(including taxable transfers) and then add non-taxable transfers.
When constructing data counterparts for the wealth and debt portfolio of each household
in the model, it is useful to refer to the following stylized household balance sheet:
Household balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Housing wealth (primary residence) Gross debt secured by housing
Home equity
Gross ￿nancial assets Gross unsecured debt
Other equity
Housing wealth is de￿ned as the sum of the value of owner-occupied home that is the
primary residence.
Gross secured debt is de￿ned as the sum of mortgage and housing debt written against
the primary residence.
The di⁄erence between the value of housing wealth and gross secured debt is the home
equity held by the household.
39Gross ￿nancial assets are de￿ned as the sum of assets besides the housing wealth de￿ned
above. This is the sum of money in checking accounts, savings accounts, money-market
accounts, money-market mutual funds, call accounts in brokerages, certi￿cates of deposit,
bonds, account-type pension plans, thrift accounts, the current value of life insurance, savings
bonds, other managed funds, other ￿nancial assets, stocks and mutual funds, owned non-
￿nancial business assets, residential and non-residential property that is not included in
housing wealth, vehicles, jewelry, antiques, or other small durable items.
Gross unsecured debt is de￿ned as all debt besides the gross secured debt de￿ned above.
The di⁄erence between the gross ￿nancial assets and gross unsecured debt is the other
equity held by each household.
Net worth is then de￿ned as the sum of durable equity and other equity.
We still need to de￿ne the data counterparts for unsecured debt, secured debt and ￿nan-
cial assets in the model. These counterparts are not equal to the gross positions since many
households in the data hold debt and ￿nancial assets at the same time which cannot occur
in the model. In order match the SCF data to the model, we consolidate the data at the
household level so that households indeed either hold debt or ￿nancial assets. We proceed
in the following way:
Unsecured debt is zero for households with nonnegative other equity and equals other
equity if other equity is negative. Secured debt for households whose other equity is negative
is set equal to their gross secured debt and their ￿nancial assets are set to zero.
For households who hold positive amounts of other equity we then consolidate these
positions with gross secured debt to obtain the corresponding measures as follows.
Secured debt is zero for households whose sum of gross secured debt and positive amounts
of other equity is positive. Otherwise secured debt equals gross secured debt net of positive
amounts of other equity.
Financial assets are zero for households whose sum of gross secured debt and positive
amounts of other equity is negative. Otherwise ￿nancial assets equal positive amounts of
other equity net of gross secured debt.
Net ￿nancial assets are the sum of ￿nancial assets, secured debt and unsecured debt.
It remains to describe how we classify households as bankrupt.
40Bankruptcy: We classify a household as bankrupt in the SCF 2004 if the household head
or husband/wife/partner have ￿led for bankruptcy in the last year.
Sample selection criteria: We drop observations if gross labor income is negative or
not su¢ cient information is available to compute net labor earnings with the NBER tax
simulator (17 observations in the SCF 2004 are deleted), net worth is smaller than -1.2 in
terms of the population average of disposable labor income in the respective year (additional
19 observations of the SCF 2004 are deleted), and unsecured debt is larger than 10 in terms
of the sample average of disposable labor income (an additional observation in the SCF 2004
is deleted). These sample selection criteria contain the e⁄ect of outliers on the sample means,
where some of the outliers seem to be related to entrepreneurial activity in which we are not
interested in this paper. The resulting sample size is 4,483. The sample size of prime-age
households between age 26 and 55 is 2,577.
Calibration of the income process
Income before retirement.
In order to construct a measure for earnings risk before retirement, we recover ￿j from the
SCF data for consumers between ages 24 and 65, which corresponds to income realizations in
the model between ages 23 and 64 since households are asked about income in the previous
year. We regress the log of earnings on a quartic age polynomial which approximates the
age-earnings patterns in the data well (Murphy and Welch, 1990). We then use the standard
deviation of the residuals in the regression to calibrate the distribution of earnings shocks zij.
We assume that the shocks are drawn from a log-normal distribution, where in our calibration
to the SCF 2004, z2004 ￿ N(0;0:603). Although a formal test rejects log-normality due to
some skewness, log-normality is a rather good parametric approximation of the data. The
assumption of log-normality is attractive because it is convenient when we approximate the
AR(1) income process by a Markov chain.
We calibrate the annual autocorrelation of log-earnings shocks as ￿ = 0:95 which implies
a variance for the innovations "ij of 0:059. We have checked the robustness of our results for
￿ = 0:97 which implies a lower variance for the innovations of 0:036. These values for the
41autocorrelation and the variance of the innovations are within the range of values commonly
used in the literature (see for example Kopecky and Suen, 2010). We approximate the AR(1)
process for zij in (12) by a Markov chain with 5 income states to contain the computational
burden, using the so-called Rouwenhorst method. As pointed out by Kopecky and Suen
(2010) this method performs particularly well for highly persistent processes.
Since the SCF surveys are repeated cross-sections and we do not observe the full life-
cycle income of most cohorts in the period for which SCF surveys are available, we convert
the cross-sectional age-earnings patterns into deterministic life-cycle pro￿les accounting for
growth in life-cycle income. As further explained below, we compute the growth rate of
average net labor earnings by constructing a pseudo panel using all comparable SCF waves
since 1983. We use that panel to regress log-labor earnings on a quartic age polynomial and a
linear time trend. We ￿nd that this parsimonious speci￿cation explains the data well. Most
importantly for our purposes we ￿nd that annual earnings growth is 1%. The estimation
results also support our assumption that cohort e⁄ects are not important, beyond the linear
time trend of earnings, when constructing the life-cycle pro￿les with cross-sectional data.
Statistically we cannot reject the hypothesis at the 1% signi￿cance level that the coe¢ cients
of cohort dummies are zero in the regression of log-labor earnings on a quartic age polynomial
and a linear time trend.
Given these results, we use average labor earnings as income unit which grow at an annual
rate of 1%. This deterministic growth is taken into account by adjusting the cross-sectional
age-earnings patterns with a growth factor 1:01(age￿base age). The base age is the reference
age which will allow us to make income units comparable across cohorts in a speci￿c year.
By considering deterministic income growth over the life cycle we attribute only part of
the cross-sectional variation in earnings to idiosyncratic labor income risk. Compared with
studies based on other surveys that do not include as many wealth-rich consumers as the
SCF, our variances of idiosyncratic income are higher. For example, in our calibration the
variance of log-earnings is roughly 0.1 above those reported in Krueger and Perri (2006),
Figure 4.
Income after retirement.
After retirement, consumers receive individual-speci￿c retirement bene￿ts bi. These ben-
42e￿ts are approximated based on the U.S. social security legislation (see http://www.ssa.gov).
Retirement bene￿ts in the U.S. depend on the 35 highest annual earnings before retirement.
In terms of the recursive formulation of the model this would imply that, until retirement,
the history of labor earnings would enter the model as a state variable. Clearly this would
make the numerical solution of the model, let alone estimation, extremely costly. We thus
follow Yang (2009) and determine retirement bene￿ts conditional on the last income before
retirement. More precisely, we proceed in the following steps.
Firstly, we transform the net labor earnings yij of the model into gross labor earnings e yij
using the average tax rate of 0.215 for the sample of households with a head between ages
24 and 65 in the SCF 2004 (including FICA taxes).
Secondly, we take into account that, for the computation of retirement bene￿ts in the
U.S., age-j earnings of individual i are scaled by average earnings growth that has occurred
between age j and the last period before retirement T r ￿ 1. We thus multiply gross labor
earnings e yij in periods j < T r by the factor 1:01(Tr￿1￿j) to obtain indexed gross labor
earnings.
Thirdly, we compute the average indexed gross labor earnings y(zi;Tr￿1) over the last
35 years before retirement [T r ￿ 35;T r ￿ 1] for a consumer who has a realization of the
stochastic component of labor earnings zi;Tr￿1 and gross earnings e yi;Tr￿1 in the last year
before retirement. Clearly, there are many di⁄erent histories of earnings which lead to e yi;Tr￿1.
We assign probabilities to these histories using the reverse transition probability R(zij;zi;j￿1).
This corresponds to the probability that zi;j￿1 is the predecessor of zij. Applying Bayes￿rule





where P is the standard ￿forward￿transition probability and f(￿) is the unconditional prob-
ability obtained from the stationary distribution.
Fourthly, we set the social-security income cap to $87;000 and the ￿rst and the second
bendpoint to $606 and $3;653, respectively, as speci￿ed in the U.S. social security legislation
for 2003 (since labor earnings in the SCF 2004 are recorded for the previous year). We then
convert this cap and these bendpoints into model units, dividing by the average equivalized
43net labor earnings of $30;866 in the SCF 2004, and adjust them for average earnings growth
over the life cycle as speci￿ed in the U.S. social security legislation.
Finally, we apply the formula as documented on the website
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/piaformula.html to compute retirement bene￿ts as
b(zi;Tr￿1) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0:9 y if y < bp1
0:9 bp1 + 0:32 (y ￿ bp1) if bp1 ￿ y < bp2
0:9 bp1 + 0:32 (bp2 ￿ bp1) + 0:15 (y ￿ bp1) if bp1 ￿ y < cap
0:9 bp1 + 0:32 (bp2 ￿ bp1) + 0:15 (cap ￿ bp1) if y ￿ cap ,
where y = y(zi;Tr￿1) and bp1 and bp2 denote the two bendpoints.
Our calibration of retirement bene￿ts implies that the replacement ratio of bene￿ts over
gross income is 51% for the median income in the last period before retirement. This re-
placement rate is similar to the rates reported in Biggs and Springstead (2008).
Pseudo-panel estimation to compute average earnings growth
The SCF is a triennial survey and comparable data exist for the period from 1983 to
2007. As is common practice, we do not use the 1986 survey since it was only a limited
reinterview survey with respondents to the 1983 SCF. This leaves us with eight repeated
cross-sectional surveys in 1983, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007.
We construct a pseudo panel for three-year age cohorts, computing cohort averages for
log-labor earnings and the terms of the quartic age polynomial. Table 5 displays the number
of observations for each of the cohort-year cells in the unbalanced pseudo panel for working-
age households with a head between ages 24 and 65. Recall that this corresponds to earnings
between model ages 23 and 64 since households in the SCF are asked about their earnings in
the previous year. Cell averages are computed with at least 90 observations and well above
100 observations for most cohort-year cells. See the seminal paper by Browning, Deaton and
Irish (1985) for further background on pseudo panels.
We augment the income process before retirement, presented in the calibration section,
with a linear time trend to capture time e⁄ects and use the pseudo panel to estimate the
log-linear speci￿cation. Note that this speci￿cation derives from the structural assumptions
about the income process. Whereas the log-linear regression of labor earnings thus has a
44Cohort number Age in 1983 1983 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
1 3￿ 5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 147 147
2 6￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 140 162 173
3 9￿ 11 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 171 197 164 188
4 12￿ 14 ￿ ￿ ￿ 157 175 193 211 210
5 15￿ 17 ￿ ￿ 143 210 193 190 249 242
6 18￿ 20 ￿ 91 165 225 209 236 266 287
7 21￿ 23 ￿ 117 209 226 261 296 296 261
8 24￿ 26 237 133 249 257 286 330 306 338
9 27￿ 29 277 204 237 270 290 347 334 306
10 30￿ 33 251 176 241 290 275 323 340 313
11 34￿ 36 262 208 249 310 297 269 303 277
12 37￿ 39 232 219 255 249 299 292 291 270
13 40￿ 42 238 185 218 269 234 235 279 241
14 43￿ 45 214 177 225 188 218 192 181 ￿
15 46￿ 48 205 171 186 199 178 175 ￿ ￿
16 48￿ 50 196 180 154 203 168 ￿ ￿ ￿
17 51￿ 53 211 165 185 189 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
18 54￿ 56 198 165 206 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
19 57￿ 59 197 162 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Sums 2,718 2,353 2,922 3,242 3,254 3,415 3,529 3,253
Table 5: Number of households in each earnings cohort per year. Source: Authors￿calcula-
tions based on the SCF.
structural interpretation, a similar regression with wealth as dependent variable has not. In
fact such a regression would be misspeci￿ed for our model. Moreover, we want to calibrate
our model to the most recent data in the 2000s so that we use the pseudo panel regressions
only to compute the annual growth rate of earnings. We then use this growth rate to map
between the age cross sections in the last available SCF survey 2004 before the ￿nancial
crisis and the life-cycle pro￿les of labor earnings and wealth in the model.
Table 6 displays the results of the regressions. In our preferred speci￿cation in column
(1), we estimate an annual growth rate of labor earnings of 1%. In column (2) we replace the
linear time trend with time dummies. Comparing the adjusted R2 statistic in columns (1)
and (2) reveals that the ￿t of the data remains good with the more parsimonious speci￿cation
in column (1). As is well known, column (3) shows that the data variation could also be
explained with cohort dummies. Because of linear dependence, we cannot simultaneously
use age, year and cohort dummies as regressors. If we restrict the age e⁄ects to a quartic
45Dependent variable: log-labor earnings
Regressors (1) (2) (3)
age 0.511 (0.203)* 0.515 (0.198)** 0.590 (0.198)**
age2 -0.018 (0.007)* -0.018 (0.007)** -0.019 (0.007)**
age3 0.00028(0.00011)* 0.00028(0.00011)** 0.00031(0.00011)**
age4 ￿1:7=106 (6:2=107)** ￿1:7=106 (6:1=107)** ￿1:8=106 (6:1=107)**
linear time trend 0.010 (0.001)** ￿ ￿
constant 4.04 (2.06) 4.00 (2.01)* 3.32 (2.01)
time dummies No Yes** No
cohort dummies No No Yes**
Adj. R2 0.818 0.827 0.833
Observations 109 109 109
Table 6: Regressions for log-labor earnings of cohorts between ages 23 and 64. Notes:
Standard errors in brackets. **: 1% signi￿cance level, *: 5% signi￿cance level. Source:
Authors￿calculations based on the SCF.
polynomial and the time e⁄ect to a linear trend, as in the speci￿cation in column (1), we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients of cohort dummies are jointly zero when
cohort dummies are added to that speci￿cation. The test statistic of the likelihood ratio test
is ￿2(17) = 28:90 with a p-value of 0:050. The lack of strong signi￿cance gives some support
to the assumption in the paper that cohort e⁄ects are captured with the linear time trend.
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